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SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL 
The Inter-temporal Character of International and 
Comparative Law Regarding the Rights of the 
Indigenous Populations of the World 
I. A PRELUDE TO FURTHER IN-DEPTH STUDIES 
This report explores ways and means in a selection of compara-
tive legal systems to ensure adequate protection ofthe rights of indig-
enous peoples within the territorial confines of national jurisdictions. 
In most contemporary legal systems, attention has been drawn to the 
problems of how best to protect and safeguard the various fundamen-
tal rights of indigenous peoples of different tribes and denominations, 
co-existing in a single or multiple legal system. 1 To ensure their sur-
vival and continued co-existence, not only their rights, but also their 
cultures, traditions, ways of life and civilizations, must be preserved 
intact as distinct but unique social, cultural, political and economic 
grouping within the same national community.2 
Unwittingly or otherwise, the evolution of national legal aware-
ness of the need for a contemporary society to provide reliable politi-
cal, economic, cultural and social security safety nets for its 
indigenous people has contributed in no small measures to the grow-
SoMPONG SucHARITKUL, D.C.L., D. Phil., M.A. (Oxon); Docteur en Droit (Paris); LL.M. 
(Harvard); of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law; Associate Dean and Distinguished 
Professor of International and Comparative Law, Golden Gate University School of 
Law, San Francisco, U.S.A. The author would like to express his gratitude to Profes-
sor Christian Okeke for his valuable suggestions and for presenting this report at the 
16'h Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law. 
1. See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, 18 December 1992; U.N Draft 
Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub 2/1994/2/Add 
20 April 1994, and American Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OAS 
Declaration 1997 OAS. G.A.Res. OEA/Ser. P, AG/Doc. 3573/97 (1997). See also Falk, 
"The Right of Self-determination under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine 
versus the Coherence of Experience," in Wolfgang Danspechgruber & A. Watts (eds.), 
Self-determination and Self-administration 47 (1997), at 55, 61. 
2. See Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, ARe-
port by the Special Repporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Popu-
lations, U.N., N.Y. & Geneva 1997, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Study Series 10, 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948-1998. See also the Report on the Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions for its 18'h session, Geneva, July 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/24, 17 Aug. 2000, by 
President-Rapporteur, Miguel Alfonso Martinez and its Annexes. 
3 
4 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 50 
ing international consciousness of the imperative necessity to protect 
the precious cultures, traditions, ways of life and civilizations of 
every indigenous people in the world.3 Inasmuch as it is desirable to 
preserve for succeeding generations the endangered species and the 
bio-diversity of the rich living resources of the sea, the land and the 
atmosphere,4 it is incumbent upon the current generation also to 
strive to protect the security, safety and social welfare of members of 
our own kind, the humankind, especially the indigenous peoples in 
each country. 
In this connection, the progressive development of international 
law tends to reflect, if not in some instances to circumscribe, the ma-
terial progress achieved in national communities. The interplay be-
tween national laws and the law of nations in legal development is 
worthy of the greatest attention. Any meaningful attempt to seek gui-
dance to ascertain the appropriate direction in which to find practical 
and plausible ways and means to guarantee the continued co-exis-
tence of indigenous peoples as distinct social collectivities and auton-
omous communities within the national entities must be preceded by 
an endeavor to appreciate the inter-action between international and 
national policies and regulations, and the mutual enhancement of the 
degree of protection between national and minimum international or 
universal standards. It is in this domain that the study of compara-
tive law is vital to the basic understanding of international legal de-
velopments. It will be seen how the use of comparative law 
techniques can serve to promote, reinforce and accelerate the process 
of crystallization of emerging norms of international law designed to 
3. Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context 
(2nd ed. 2000). Note the existence of two binding instruments of general application 
to indigenous peoples: The 1957 ILO Convention No. 106 and ILO Convention No. 169 
effective 1991. Work on the Draft Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples of 
1994 began in 1977 with the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Popula-
tions of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. A movement to recognize the interests of indigenous peoples has acted in 
eamest for the past 15 years. The right of indigenous peoples has since gained in-
creasing recognition as distinctive communities deserving a special intemationallaw 
regime distinct from individual rights and the rights of minorities. Indeed, indigenous 
peoples often constitute minorities in a modem westem style community, but indige-
nous peoples are not precluded from directing the administration of a country, nor 
from becoming majorities in a given society. On July 28, 2000, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council decided to establish, by consensus resolution. a "Perma-
nent Forum on Indigenous Issues" as a subsidiary organ of the Council. ECOSOC Res. 
2000/22. 
4. See The U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973, EAS (16 U.S.C.A. § 1660 to 
1614), Renewable Resources Extension Act of 1978, RREA, (16 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1671-1676). On the intemational plane, See, for instance, The RIO Declaration on 
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992 (27 Principles), The Washington 
Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment for Land-based Activities, 
Washington 1995, as adopted on 1 November 1995, and Convention on Biological Di-
versity, entered into force from 29 December 1995. For status of ratification, as of 10 
July 1995, See UNEP Handbook of Environmental Law 271-74 (1999). 
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preserve and protect the political, economic, social and cultural val-
ues of indigenous peoples populating the earth. On the other hand, 
adherence to generally accepted norms of international law will serve 
the cause of the indigenous peoples within any given national legal 
order. 
A survey of general legal aspects and different dimensions of the 
subject of this report requires an initial and detailed systematic anal-
ysis and a thorough examination of a given situation leading to the 
consideration of substantive rights, individual and collective, which 
are specifically pertinent to ensure the healthful survival of indige-
nous civilizations. The present report is but a necessary prelude to 
further in-depth studies on the rights of the indigenous peoples. 
In this report, certain basic questions will be addressed in order 
to pave the way to a better appreciation of the delicate and complex 
task ahead. 
II. THE UsE oF TERMS 
For the purpose of this report, as indeed for most other purposes, 
the first and foremost hurdle to overcome is the ascription of a precise 
meaning to the use of crucial terms, or a meaningful response to defi-
nitional questions. The Preamble of the San Francisco Charter of 
1945 starts with the opening phrase "We the peoples ... " The term 
"peoples" has never ceased to encounter countless difficulties in vari-
ous contexts surrounding the right of self-determination of "peoples" 
within a national unit. All the more perplexing is this term "peoples" 
in regard to the right of secession, which is admitted as a collective 
constitutional right in some countries5 but is considered as under-
mining national territorial integrity of the federal union in others.6 
5. See Article 70, 71 and 72, Chapter 8 of the USSR Constitution of October 7, 
1977, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow 0977). 
Article 70: "The USSR is an integral, federal, multinational State formed on the prin-
ciple of socialist federalism as a result of the self-determination of nations and the 
voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics ... " 
Article 71 lists 14 units of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republics. 
Article 72 : "Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the 
USSR." 
As indeed in reality, the Soviet Socialist Republics did secede from the USSR upon its 
disintegration, namely Ukraine, Latvia, Lithunia, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Moldava, Ka-
zakhstan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Krygyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbek-
istan. Chechnya, however, was not listed as a distinct member of the Union of the 
Soviet Socialist Republics. 
6. The U.S. Constitution recognizes no such right or freedom for any state of the 
Federal Union to secede. For Reference re Secession of Quebec, see Opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Canada [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1342 (1998). The 
Supreme Court cited the Constitutional Act, 1876 as an act of nation-building and 
that federalism was the political mechanism by which diversity could be recognized 
with unity. The Constitution Act 1982 removed the last vestige of British authority 
and re-affirmed the country's commitment to the protection of its minority, to equality 
and to the fundamental freedoms as declared in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
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This marked absence of a generally accepted definition of the term 
"peoples" does not appear helpful to the search for an agreed use of 
the term "indigenous peoples". 
Unless a clearer definition of "indigenousness" could timely be 
found, there would seem to be little or no likelihood of a generally 
accepted definition of "indigenous peoples". Indeed, the U.N. Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples neatly managed to 
avoid any attempt to define the concept of "indigenous peoples".7 
Even without a precise definition or an express provision on the 
use of the term "indigenous peoples" in the present context, it is none-
theless useful, as an indication of a general notion or conception of 
the term, 8 as used in an international instrument, such as the ILO 
Freedoms. The Court observed that a right to secede 'unilaterally' is the right to effec-
tuate secession without prior negotiation with the other provinces and the federal 
government. At issue is the legality of the final act of purported unilateral secession. 
"The federalism principle, in conjunction with the democratic principle, dictates that 
the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of 
the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province (even after a referen-
dum procedure) could give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to confedera-
tion to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire ... (para. 88)" The 
court thus disclaimed any supervisory role over the political aspects of constitutional 
negotiation. "Both the legality of the acts of the parties to the negotiation process 
under Canadian law, and the perceived legitimacy of such action, would be important 
considerations in the negotiations process ... (para. 103)" The Opinion cited relevant 
portions of international documents, including G. A. Resolution 50/6 of 9 November 
1995 U.N. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary which in Article 7 
provides that the member States ofthe U.N. will continue to reaffirm the right of self-
determination of all peoples ... This shall not be construed as authorizing or encour-
aging any action that would dismember or impair totally or in part. the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting them-
selves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples ... (para. 114). There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of 
the territorial integrity of existing States, including Canada, and the· right of a people 
to achieve a full measure of self-determination. 
The Court noted, in paragraph 139, "However, the concern of aboriginal peoples is 
precipitated by asserted right of Quebec to unilateral secession. In lights of our find-
ing ... that on the contrary a clear democratic expression of support for secession 
would lead under the constitution to negotiation in which aboriginal interests would 
be taken into account, it becomes unnecessary to explore further the concern of ab-
original peoples in this Reference." 
7. See U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples 20 April1994 
and the OAS draft cited in the note 1 above. The draft did not attempt to define indig-
enous peoples. The U.S. preliminary statement continued to resist the use of the term 
"peoples" in the plural, and the characterization of indigenous rights as collective 
right in both the U.N. and the OAS drafts. Brazil was equally reluctant to use the 
term "peoples" because of its association with the right of self-determination, which 
could entail the right to independent statehood and secession under international 
law, in the absence of any prohibition or authorization of unilateral secession by a 
people from within an existing sovereign and independent State. 
8. Reisman, "Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication," 89 
A.J.I.L. 350 (1995) refers to the "natives," "aborigines," or "indigenous peoples" as 
ones who were the time that proto-human bands roamed the wilds and lost, they ei-
ther resisted organized peoples who invaded their inhabited territories, or were de-
nied, assimilation and survived with a distinct, but not necessarily intact, cultural 
identity. The term has recently come to refer to a new pattern of claims, made by 
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Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989 (Convention 
No. 169)9 to mention some of the criteria commonly used, namely 
aboriginality, cultural distinctiveness and self-identification10 as at-
tributes of "indigenousness".l1 The United Nations special Re-
porteurs appear to use the term with reference to those peoples who, 
"having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial so-
cieties, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the socie-
ties now prevailing in those territories or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of societies and are determined to pre-
serve, develop and transmit to future generations, their ancestral ter-
ritories, and their ethnic identities, as the basis of their continued 
existence as peoples in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions, and legal systems."12 
The ILO Convention No. 169, in Article 1, stipulates that the 
Convention applies to "(b) peoples in independent countries who are 
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the popula-
tions which inhabited the countries, or by geographic region to which 
the countries belong, at the time of the conquest or colonization or the 
establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of 
their legal status retain some or all of their own social, economic, cul-
tural and political situations."13 Article 2 regards self-identification 
as indigenous or tribal as "a fundamental criterion for determining 
the group to which the provisions of this Convention applies."14 
these surviving indigenous peoples for direct protection by the international commu-
nity and where appropriate, restoration of rights taken from them in the past. 
9. See Leary, "Lessons From the Experience of the Intemational Labour Organi-
zation," in The United Nations and Human Rights (P. Alston ed. 1992). Convention 
No. 169 entered into force in 1991, requiring "special measures" be adopted to safe-
guard indigenous interests, and recognizing the rights of ownership and possession of 
the peoples over the lands they traditionally occupy, and the right to retain their own 
customs and institutions not incompatible with fundamental rights. 
10. See Swepston, "A New Step in the Intemational Law on Indigenous and Tri-
bal peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989," 15 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 677 (1990); see 
also 28 Int'l Leg. Mats. 1382 (1989). 
11. See Barsh, "The World's Indigenous Peoples," White Paper Submitted to Cal-
vert Group by First Nations Development Institute First Peoples Worldwide: also by 
the same author, "United Nations Seminar on Indigenous Peoples and States," 83 
A.J.I.L. 599 (1989). 
12. U.N. Special Reporteurs, Jose Martinez Cobo (1984) and Erica-Irene A. Daes 
(1994) identified the three components of "indigenous" as including "aboriginality," 
"distinctive culture" and "self-identification." 
13. Article 1(3) provides that the "use of the term 'peoples' in this Convention 
shall not be construed as having any implication as regards the right which may at-
tach to the term under intemationallaw". See also Barsh, "Indigenous Peoples in the 
1990's: From Object to Subject of Intemational Law?," 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 33, 35 
(1994). 
14. Self-identification by the group or a member of the group is a useful prerequi-
site of indigenousness. Minorities and indigenous peoples form objects of separate in-
temational instruments. De lege ferenda, indigenous peoples are to be distinguished 
from minorities, although in many instances their rights are partially covered by the 
rights available for the protection of minorities. 
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U.N. reports and other recent international instruments appear 
to relate more specifically to only one type of situations created by 
European invasion, conquest and colonization of territories occupied 
by indigenous populations of Northern and Southern American conti-
nents and the seizure of lands held by aboriginal tribes in Australia 
and New Zealand. In reality, the need to preserve indigenous social 
and cultural identities exists throughout the world. The problems en-
countered by indigenous peoples are far from uniform, ranging from 
international endeavors to salvage and maintain indigenous identi-
ties and cultures after years of alien domination or colonization by 
Western or European nations or by neighboring kingdoms, 
princedoms or tribesmen to national self-preservation in an effort to 
ward off or to pre-empt any display or threat of foreign superior force 
or authority. While numerous studies have been made in an effort to 
shed more light on the fate of indigenous populations in the United 
States, Canada, Latin America,15 Australia and New Zealand16 with 
comparable and contrasting approaches and varying degrees of suc-
cess, very little or nothing has been published about indigenous civili-
zations in other parts of the world, such as Southeast Asia, China, 
Japan, the Indian sub-continent, the Pacific Islands, and Africa. 
The conceptual and definitional deficiencies inherent in frac-
tional and sectarian approaches to the problems confronting indige-
nous populations of the world will become more transparent, if we 
could extricate ourselves from the narrow confines of the societies in 
which we live. Indeed, the world itself has evolved through the pas-
sage of millions of years, witnessing the ever-changing faces of the 
earth and the evolutionary diversification of the human race and spe-
cies. It has been suggested that all in all between 6,000 and 10,000 
original cultures could be characterized as "indigenous," but most of 
them were absorbed by the growth of modern Nation-States ages 
ago. 17 It is not always clear, noted one author, 18 whether a particular 
group is an "indigenous" people or "minorities". The difference is per 
chance a matter of degree.19 China, for instance, has always recog-
nized at various times, the existence within the Celestial Empire of 
15. See, e.g., Roberts, "The Protection of Indigenous Population's Cultural Prop-
erty in Peru, Mexico and the United States," 4 Tulsa J. Camp. & Int'l L. 327 (1997); 
and Kreimer, "The Beginnings of the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples," 9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 271 (1996). 
16. See generally Quentin-Baxter, "The U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples - The International and Constitutional Law Contexts," 29 Victo-
ria U. Wellington L. Rev. 85 (1999). 
17. See Barsh, White Paper, supra n. 11. 
18. Id. and also supra n. 14. 
19. Indigenous peoples may be in the majority, or in power for that matter, or 
they may be included within different "minorities." Members of the indigenous peo-
ples should enjoy the protection designed for the indigenous population and yet not 
precluded from the enjoyment of minorities rights inasmuch as they may be partly 
entitled also to minorities rights. 
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distinct "minorities", as much indigenous to Mainland China as the 
various Chinese ethnic groups themselves are aboriginal to East 
Asia. 
(a) "Aboriginality" as a necessary criterion is not in itself free of 
imprecision. ''Ab origine" means from the very beginning. Thus, an 
ethnic group that was first formed in a particular locality could be 
said to be aboriginal and thereby satisfies the test of aboriginality. 
This does not preclude the possibility of a multiplicity of different in-
digenous groups in one and the same geographical area or zone, 
which again through the passage of millennia and centuries may 
evolve or change its characteristics or its dimension or geographical 
contour beyond recall, recollection or even recognition. For these rea-
sons, "aboriginality" as a criterion is relative to the time frame within 
which the term is used. 20 
(b) "Cultural Distinctiveness" is another criterion that deserves 
particular attention. Distinctiveness of a culture could in time fade 
out or dissipate for various reasons due to the need or desirability of 
assimilation or merger with another equally distinctive culture, 
thereby losing its original uniqueness. Cultural distinctiveness has 
its beginning, i.e., its aboriginality, but it could also fall into oblivion 
or desuetude, out of vogue or fashion, losing its originality or blurring 
its uniqueness.21 
(c) "Self-identification" constitutes a formal test. If, and as long 
only as a group continues to identifY itself as an "indigenous" group, 
its "indigenousness" is established and maintained unchallenged. Ra-
tione cessante, whenever the group ceases to identifY itself as such, it 
no longer retains its "indigenousness" and becomes blended with or 
assimilated to the massive members of the society in which the group 
has been integrated. Therefore, this last criterion also is coterminous 
with a time-frame, outside of which it no longer exists or ceases to 
exist as a distinctive indigenous people.22 
20. See generally Lokan, "From Recognition to Reconciliation; The Functions of 
ABORIGINAL Rights Law," 23 Melbourne U.L.R. 65 (1999). The term 'aborigines' is 
used, depending on the context, to refer to either the indigenous peoples of Australia, 
the indigenous peoples of Canada, or indigenous peoples in general. See also Van der 
Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507, 562: "Aboriginal rights arise from the prior occupation ofland, 
but they also arise from the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of "ab-
original peoples on that land." 
21. See Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507, 562: " ... courts must look at both the 
relationship of an aboriginal claimant to the land and at the practices, customs and 
traditions arising from the claimant's distinctive culture and society." 
22. ld. " Courts must not focus so entirely on the relationship of aboriginal peo-
ples with the land that they lose sight of the other factors relevant to the identifica-
tion and defmition of aboriginal rights." See the U.N. Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination ('CERD'), Findings on the Native title Amendment Act 1998 
(th), U.N. Doc. ERD/c/54/misc. 40/Rev.2 (18 March 1999). 
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III. THE CHANGING POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE GLOBE 
Most commentators on indigenous heritage23 and the rights of 
indigenous peoples24 recognize the political vicissitudes which mate-
rially affect the transfer of territories and modification or rectifica-
tion of national boundaries. The map of the globe today is not the 
same as yesteryear. Indeed, the world map has undergone innumera-
ble changes, including succession of states, disintegration of sover-
eign nations, merger and unification of states, annexation of 
territories. Changes in national frontiers and boundaries have been 
matters of frequent if not intermittent occurrences. New countries 
are both created, established or dissolved, dismantled and removed 
from the geographical coordinates wherein they used to be situated. 
These are natural phenomena of the changing face of the surface of 
the earth, thanks to the events that have taken place with the cycle of 
war and peace or relative peacefulness and continual state of interna-
tional and internal armed conflicts, resulting in territorial alteration 
and modification of nationallandscapes.25 
The names of the countries are usually associated with their geo-
graphical location and dimension. Geography, at any rate, political 
geography, as reflected in the boundary making and delimitation of 
frontiers, territorial, maritime and aerial or atmospheric, changes 
with time. It is therefore only pertinent that any reference to a partic-
ular locality or country for purposes of protection of indigenous rights 
or cultural heritage must be qualified by the time element or the time 
frame within which to engage a meaningful discussion.26 
Europeans are aware of the changing frontiers of Europe. 
Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and Former Yugoslavia provide ample evidences of fluctuation 
in place names, country denomination and boundaries.27 Asians are 
23. For the meaning of "heritage," Erica-Irene A. Daes in her report on the "Pro-
tection of the Heritage of Indigenous People," U.N., N.Y. and Geneva, 1997, defines 
the term as "everything that belongs to the distinct identity of a people and which is 
theirs to share, if they wish, with other peoples ... the creative production of human 
thought and craftsmanship, such as songs, stories, scientific knowledge and 
artworks .... inheritances from the past and from nature, such as human remains, 
the natural factors of the landscape, and naturally-occurring species of plants and 
animals with which the peoples have long been connected". 
24. See generally Donald Craig Mitchell, Sold America: The Story of Alaska Na-
tive and Their Land, 1867-1959 (1997); and "Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Stat-
utory Constitution or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Courts," 14 Alaska L. Rev. 
353 (1997). 
25. See Arsanjani, "Environmental Rights and Indigenous Wrongs," 9 St. Thomas 
L. Rev. 85 (1960, and Triggs, "Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law: 
Validity of the Native Title Amendment Act 1998," 23 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 372 
(1999). 
26. See generally Reisman, supra n. 8. 
27. With the advent of the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics and Former Yugoslavia, Europe has seen the rise of new members. See note 5 
above. 
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fully cognizant of the differences or absence thereof between Siam 
and Thailand, Cambodia and Kampuchea, Burma and Myanmar, 
Laos and Siam Lao, Vietnam (North, South and Vietcong) and Korea 
(North and South).28 Africans on the other hand are getting used to 
new names for older nations such as Ethiopia, Abyssinia, the Gold 
Coast, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mali, Gambia, 
Zambia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, etc.29 The list continues.30 
It is not practical, nor indeed desirable to evaluate the status of 
the indigenous peoples within the territorial confines of a given na-
tion or State without delineating the relevant time frame. The tempo-
ral dimension is essential to any useful discussion of the need to 
protect the rights and heritage of the peoples who are considered to 
be indigenous to the area, as a geographical unit at a given time, 
within a designated time slot.31 
IV. DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND VoLUNTARY MoVEMENTS OF 
GLOBAL POPULATIONS 
Regardless of the relativity of war and peace, indigenous, tribal 
and aboriginal populations have freely moved from one geographical 
location to another. Indigenous peoples including the Nomadic tribes 
have moved about, back and forth, and relocate in massive popula-
tion transfer more or less freely of their own volition, in search for 
better environments, milder climate, greater abundance ofwater and 
food supplies or for any other reason.32 As long as peoples live in a 
social group or a community, there is always an opportunity to look 
for a better place to farm, to fish, to hunt or to settle on more fertile 
soil within friendlier or less hostile surroundings. This is a natural 
phenomenon in demographic displacement.33 
When an indigenous population moves from its former habitat to 
another location where there are no other former inhabitants, the 
28. See The U.N. Transitory Authority for East Timor. See also Ntumy, "The Pro-
tection of the Ethnic autonomy of Kanaks in New Caledonia," 10 UCLA Pac. Basin L. 
J. 376 (1992). 
29. See Barsh, White Paper, supra n. 11; " ... Africans consider themselves indig-
enous peoples who have achieved decolonization and self-determination". 
30. ld. "Yet many relatively small nomadic herding and hunter-gatherer societies 
such as the Thareg (Niger), Maasai (Kenya), Mbuti (Congo) and San (Southern Af-
rica's Kalahari have been displaced and oppressed (internally colonized) by ethnically 
unrelated African peoples who have been their neighbours for a thousand years and 
longer". 
31. See, for instance, a case note by Barnett, "Western Australia v. Ward: One 
Step Forward and Two Steps Back: Native title and the Bundle of Rights Analysis," 
24 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 462 (2000). 
32. See, for instance, Western Sahara Case 1975 ICJ Rep. 12 (Advisory opinion of 
Oct. 16). 
33. See, for instance, the Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 ICJ Rep. 351 (Sept. 11) be-
tween El Salvador and Honduras, Nicaragua intervening with the Court's permission. 
The case related to earlier rights of "Indian poblaciones" and the settlement by the 
1980 peace treaty ending the Soccer War of 1969. 
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original group does not lose its indigenous character, as it retains its 
aboriginality in connection with the newfound territory which could 
literally be regarded as "no man's land" or "terra nullius".34 It could 
also happen that one indigenous group moving out of its place of ori-
gin into a new territory may encounter yet another distinctive aborig-
inal group indigenous to that newly chosen territory.35 Negotiations 
could ensue, leading to an amiable settlement or an armed conflict or 
confrontation could break out requiring resolution by means that 
could be short of the use of force. 36 
Apart from the movements of nomadic hill tribes and tribesmen 
in the desert such as the Sahara, there have been massive move-
ments of peoples indigenous to Asia and the Pacific, notably Chinese, 
Indians, Mongolians, Iranians, Persians, Eskimos, Israelites, Malays 
and Polynesians.37 These ethnic groups are indigenous to their home-
lands but in their newfound land or island of their choice, they are 
not indigenous. They are no longer aboriginal, but are visitors, immi-
grants or invited guests of the original native born groups. Clearly, 
the Chinese in San Francisco or the Thais in Los Angeles are not 
aboriginal, nor indigenous to California. They are nonetheless indige-
nous to China and Thailand respectively despite their becoming 
Asian minorities or Californians.38 In the United States, Chinese and 
Thais are not indigenous and should not be treated as such, while 
native Americans or American/Canadian Indians of various tribes 
and denominations should be so treated with due respect to their cul-
tural heritage and indigenous rights in the United States as to a 
greater or lesser degree also in Canada.39 
As has been abundantly demonstrated, the relativity of "indige-
nousness" has been caused by the voluntary migration or movements 
of populations from their place of origin or homelands to their new 
places of adoption. The treatment of a single indigenous population, 
such as the Chinese or overseas Chinese affords an interesting com-
34. The Eskimos, the Mongolians and the Alaskans moved about freely not only 
in the northern region but also in the Pacific. 
35. Pacific Islands, including Japanese, Taiwanese, Okinawan, etc., have received 
many waves of visitors. 
36. Southeast Asia has afforded fertile ground or Promised Land, land of opportu-
nities for many immigrations from without. See also Kingsbury, "Indigenous People, 
in International Law; A Constitutionist Approach to the Asian Controversy," 92 
A.J.I.L 414 (1998). 
37. There are overseas Chinese and overseas Indians, especially in Southeast 
Asia and the Pacific from time immemorial. 
38. Asians in the United States are classified, depending on the origin or the pe-
riod, as Chinese, Pacific Islanders or simply Asians. 
39. The term "Indians" have different meaning, depending on the usage. In the 
Americas, it refers to Native Americans of various tribes. In Asia and Africa, it refers 
to population indigenous to the Indian Subcontinent. The term "East Indies" and 
"West Indies" refer to different ethnic groups. "East Indies" are Indonesian, Javanese, 
Balinese, Sumatrans etc., while "West Indies" are the islanders in the Caribbean im-
ported by England. 
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parison or contrast from one country-study to another, from one legal 
system to the next. As minorities, the Chinese are accorded certain 
minorities rights in various states of the United States and Canada. 
In Thailand, they have been assimilated in accordance with a na-
tional policy adopted by King Chulalongkorn almost a century and a 
half ago with full rights and titles as Thai subjects, while maintain-
ing their respective traditional ethnic Chinese ancestry.40 In Malay-
sia, a new national policy of "Bhumi Putra", literally children of the 
land, has been implemented with the result that non-native Bhumi 
Putra without discrimination, Chinese or Indian alike, enjoy less 
than the equal protection, equal rights and privileges accorded to Ma-
lay "Bhumi Putra".41 The application of new laws and regulations re-
garding the protection of indigenous rights by the homeland itself 
must be viewed and tested within a time-limit or a period of time 
when the indigenous rights are recognized and protected by the home 
state as against further encroachments by outsiders not only, as mea-
sures of self-protection but rather as the duty to preserve their indig-
enous heritage. 
The above category of cases must be contrasted with the more 
unenviable cases of Western expansionism in the new world, in Asia 
and in Africa, especially in the societies where the surviving indige-
nous populations continue to subsist under the governance, if not 
domination, of their uninvited European or Western intruders.42 Ac-
cording to the voices of these indigenous peoples heard in the forums 
of international human rights within the framework of the United 
Nations, they would like to have their collective indigenous rights 
recognized as such in the first place.43 Secondly, they would like to 
have their territorial rights restored and their land returned.44 
Thirdly, they would like to have their right to self-determination as 
an autonomy or a self-government45 within the established commu-
nity. Fourthly, they would like to have their legal status recognized 
by the international community.46 These are four of the initial con-
cerns voiced by or on behalf of the indigenous peoples in the United 
40. See part VII infra. 
41. The precise definition of"Bhumi Putra" remains to be worked out through the 
process of judicial interpretation, which increasingly is shifting from English to Malay 
as the principal official language of the law and the courts. 
42. See Roberts, supra n. 15. 
43. Williams, "Encounters on the Frontier of International Human Rights Law: 
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World," 1990 Duke L. J. 
660 (1990). 
44. See generally Morse, "Common Roots but Modern Divergencies: Aboriginal 
policies in Canada and the United States," 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 115 (1997). 
45. See generally Suagee, "Human Rights of Indigenous People: Will the United 
States Rise to the Occasion?," 21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 365 (1997). 
46. See, for instance, the Indigenous Peoples' Seattle Declaration on the Occasion 
of the Third Ministerial Meeting of the WTO November 30-December 3, 1999, availa-
ble at, http://www.ldb.org/indi99.htm. 
14 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 50 
States, Canada and Australia. It will be seen how step-by-step these 
concerns have been or are being addressed in comparatively different 
forms and measures in the three common-law systems concerned.47 
v. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AT THEIR BEST WHERE NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS MEET 
If in the better known examples of the indigenous peoples in the 
United States, Canada and Australia, their plights have received 
public notice and national as well as international attention with a 
remote chance of continuing gradual improvements of their lot, the 
evolution of national positions appears to an appreciable extent to 
have been prompted by the loud outcries from these vocal indigenous 
populations themselves in national, regional and international fo-
rums.48 It should not be forgotten that international law, or the then 
prevailing European generated law of nations, has provided some 
fragile legal basis for the original deprivations of their pre-existing 
inherent rights as independent sovereign nations and peoples.49 
By way of illustration, Chief Justice John Marshall in Johnson v. 
M'lntosh (1823) 50 elaborated the doctrine that the invading European 
acquired exclusive rights and control over the territories they discov-
ered in spite of the subsisting occupation by the indigenous Native 
Americans. Upon discovery, the sovereign rights of the indigenous 
populations were necessarily curtailed 5 1 and their power to dispose of 
the land at will was denied while their territories under their time-
honored occupation were regarded as "terra nullius" or " no man's 
land" open to usurpation and acquisition of new title by mere dispos-
session. Even for "terra nullius", Max Huber decided in the Island of 
Palmas case 192852 that it could never be acquired by discovery 
alone. Discovery merely gives an inchoate title which has to be fol-
lowed up by effective occupation involving consistent and sustainable 
display of sovereign authority. 5 3 
47. See sections V and VI infra. 
48. See generally Kaon-Cohen, "Native Justice in Australia, Canada and the 
U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis," 7 Monash U. L. Rev. 250 (1981). 
49. See generally Bravo, "Balancing Rights to Land and the Demands of Eco-
nomic Development: Lessons from the United States and Australia," 30 Colum. J. L. 
& Soc. Prob. 529 (1997). 
50. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 453 (1823). The dispute related to land purchased from the 
Indian, now Illinois. 
51. Id. at 272-74. The European discovery doctrine gave exclusive right and con-
trol to the European explorers over the land and the people occupying. 
52. See Huber, "Sole Arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Case. U.S.A. v. Nether-
lands," P.C.A. (1928) 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829. 
53. See Robert Jennings, Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963). 
The Arbitrator Huber cited Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 4 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1845), 
and Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890). See Jessup, 22 A.J.I.L. and Johnson, 
"Constitution as a Root of Title in International Law," 1995 Cambridge L.J. 215 
(1955). 
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In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831)54 Chief Justice Marshall, 
relegating the status of American Indians to "domestic dependent na-
tions", denied their standing to bring suit in aU. S. court, but would 
advise the Indians to appeal to the tomahawk.55 In the last case of 
the Marshall trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 56 some protection 
was afforded to the Cherokees. The Supreme Court struck down the 
Georgian statute designed to destroy the Cherokee's political commu-
nity and possession of their land. Native Indian sovereignty was rec-
ognized and legal consent was required to extinguish native title of 
the Indians. This decision appeared promising but in practice yielded 
no positive results, since it lacked the executive power of 
enforcement. 57 
If Chief Justice Marshall had tried unsuccessfully to apply a 
brake to the European doctrine of discovery by recognizing the exis-
tence of treaty rights conceded by the United States Government, the 
United States Supreme Court in the last three decades has consist-
ently upheld the absolute plenary power of the federal government 
over Indian Affairs, including authorization to destroy Indian relig-
ious sites and practices, to suppress traditional forms of tribal gov-
ernment, forcibly to remove Indian children from their homes, 
without payment of compensation to take resources, and to induce 
involuntary sterilization of indigenous Indian women, among other 
genocidal and ethnocidal ventures.58 
Stripped of all collective rights as indigenous populations with-
out traditional territorial links, or any right of self-determination or 
the slightest international legal status, native Americans in the 
United States and in Canada have not been able to avail themselves 
of their treaty rights on the ground that under international law in-
digenous parties were devoid of any treaty-making capacity attribu-
table to independent sovereign nations and peoples.59 The United 
States and Canadian laws relying on Eurocentric international law 
have failed to recognize the validity of treaties with native North 
54. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
55. Id. at 18. 
56. 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515, 542, 543 (1832). Marshall refmed his characterization 
and described the Indian tribe as "distinct peoples, divided into separate nations, in-
dependent of each other, and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own 
and governing themselves by their own laws." 
57. The Worcester decision was never enforced, and the Cherokees were forced off 
their land across the Mississippi. See Russell, "High Courts and the Rights of Aborigi-
nal Peoples: The Limits of Judicial Independence," 61 Sask. L. Rev. 247,267 (1998), at 
251-52. 
58. See the United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 37 (1980) and the 
Lone Wolf case, 187 U.S. at 568. 
59. The Transfer of Indian Claims from the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) to 
the Court of Claim in 1978 and no longer compensable hereunder. Unlike treaties 
recognized in treaties and other agreements, native title was not compsenable under 
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 25 U.S.C § 70v (1978). 
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American Indians as of any value beyond contracts of private law 
character unenforceable against the unwilling authority of the politi-
cal branch of the government.60 
The survival of the indigenous peoples of North America and the 
continued subsistence of the aboriginal peoples of Australia would de-
pend in large measures on the generosity and mercy of the prevailing 
authorities of the European settlers. The political will to abide by the 
national laws which could improve from total disregard of any indige-
nous rights to gradual recognition and readiness to implement some 
of the measures in support of the indigenous heritage.61 Further im-
provements on the national legal fronts will depend largely on posi-
tive progressive developments of international law setting general 
minimum standards designed to preserve and protect the traditional 
values and cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples.62 It is possible 
for international law to become more internationalized and better hu-
manized in favour of the indigenous communities with the view, in 
the ultimate analysis, to inducing more beneficial national legislation 
to give effect to international aspirations.63 The sooner the meeting 
could be arranged between national and international legal doc-
trines, the happier will appear to be the indigenous populations on 
this earth. The meeting or increased overlap between the interna-
tional legal order and the various national legal systems will contrib-
ute to the improvement of the climate that fosters greater protection 
of indigenous rights.6 4 
VI. NATIONAL AccEPTANCE oF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
A comparative study ofthe practice of Canada and ofthe United 
States in a pair of parallel cases involving a claim or claims of indige-
nous Canadian and American Indian women to have their pre-mari-
tal indigenous status and rights restored will illustrate the relative 
ease with which in Canada, where the possibility exists for individual 
petition under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights of 196665 and its Protocol, an aggrieved native Canadian 
60. See Cross, "Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the preservation of In-
dian Country in the Twenty-First Century," 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 425, 431 (1998), a shift 
from an Indian 'trading' to an Indian 'raiding' strategy as a more sufficient means of 
acquiring Indian Lands, at 455. 
61. See Triggs, "Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law: Validity 
of the Native Title Amendment Act, 1998," 23 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 372 (1999), and 
supra n. 25. 
62. See Anaya, "Indigenous Peoples, International Law Issues, 92 Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting," ASIL 96 (1998). 
63. See Green, "Aboriginal Peoples, International law and the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedom," 16 Canadian Bar Review 113 (1982). 
64. See generally Maritza Pena Guzman, "The Emerging System of International 
Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights," 9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 251 (1996). 
65. Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (xxi), 21 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 171 entered into force March 23 1976. 
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American Indian could successfully vindicate her indigenous rights. 
Once the home State is willing to accept international standards, ef-
fective ways and means can be found through the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee to have her complaint against discrimination 
based on gender heard and resolved. 
Thus, in Lovelace v. Canada (1981), 66 Sandra Lovelace submit-
ted a communication, stating that she was a 32 year-old-woman, liv-
ing in Canada, born and registered as "Maliseet Indian" but has lost 
her rights and status as an Indian in accordance with section 12 (1) 
(b) ofthe Indian Act of Canada, after having married a non-Indian on 
23 May 1970. However, an Indian man marrying a non-Indian wo-
man does not lose his Indian status. The Indian Act therefore violates 
article 2 (1), 3, 23 (1) and ( 4), 26 and 27 of the Covenant of 1966. In its 
submission, Canada the State party recognized that "many of the 
provisions of the Indian Act, including section 12(1) (b) require seri-
ous reconsideration and reform. The Committee observed that Ca-
nada had undertaken under Article 2(1) and (2) of the Covenant to 
respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction, the rights recognized in the Covenant without dis-
tinction of any kind such as gender, and to adopt the necessary mea-
sures to give effect to these rights." The Committee further observed 
that "the major loss to a person ceasing to be an Indian is the loss of 
the cultural benefits of having Indian Community, the emotional ties 
to home, family, friends and neighbours, and the loss of identity."67 
Accordingly, the Committee acting under Article 5(4) of the Optional 
Protocol is of the view that the facts of the present case, which estab-
lish that Sandra Lovelace has been denied the legal right to reside in 
the Tobique Reserve, disclose a breach by Canada of article 27 of the 
Covenant.68 On July 28, 1985 the Indian Act amendment (S.C. 1985, 
C. 27) came into force in Canada. The amended Act omitted section 
12(1) (b), which prescribed that Indian women marrying non-Indian 
lose their Indian status. It allowed registration oflndians who previ-
ously lost their Indian status under the repealed section of the Indian 
Act. As a result of the amendment, 24,000 persons regained indige-
66. See Communication No. 24/1977 by Sandra Lovelace on 29 December 1977 
and Views by the Human Rights Committee on 30 July 1981 (thirteenth session), 
Report of the HRC, 36 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No.40) at 166, U.N. Doc. at 36/40 (1981). 
67. See Lovelace case as reported and commented in Frank Newman and David 
Weissbrodt, "Intemational Human Rights," second printing Aug. 1991. pp. 75-84. 
68. Article 27 provides: "In these States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
communities with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, and to 
practice their religion, or to use their own language. 
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nous rights and Indian Status.69 This amendment also served to 
avoid violating section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 70 
A way was found and a means adopted for Canada to right the 
wrongs suffered by 24,000 married Indian women whose indigenous 
status has since been resuscitated.71 Without the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee as a body responsible for hearing communications 
and stating its views, and without the good faith and willingness of 
the Canadian Government to accept international standards, the 
plight of the 24,000 married Indian women in Canada would have 
remained unattended let alone resolved.72 
The Canadian case of Sandra Lovelace is to be contrasted with 
the U.S. case of Martinez in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo (1976). 73 
This case concerned the validity of a membership ordinance of Santa 
Clara Pueblo in New Mexico. The appellants are female members of 
the Pueblo who, not unlike Lovelace in Canada, are married to non-
members, together with their children. The ordinance grants mem-
bership of the Pueblo to "all children born of marriages between male 
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members" but precludes 
membership for "children born of marriages between female mem-
bers of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members"74 In the Trial 
Court the decision was in favour of the defendants.75 The Supreme 
Court in 1978 reversed the lOth Circuit, declining jurisdiction over 
complaints under the Indian Civil Rights Act (25 U.S.C. § 1302) and 
dismissed the case without discussing the merits,76 except finding in 
the legislative history a desire to protect Indian self-determination. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress intended that such suits 
be heard in tribal fora that are better suited to evaluate questions of 
tribal tradition,77 thereby abdicating its responsibilities to promote 
69. See Opekokew, "Self-Identification and Culture Preservation: A Commentary 
on Recent Indian Act Amendments," 2 Canadian National Rep. 1, 2-5 (1986). 
70. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1981, section 15(1), 27 and 28. 
71. Although Lovelace case was an individual petition under article 5(4) of the 
Optional Protocol. the views of the Committee not only prompted the adoption of the 
1985 Amendment but also enabled the registration of24,000 Indians otherwise previ-
ously deprived of their Indian status. 
72. Compare and contrast the Martinez case in paragraph 33 below. Compare 
also the decision of U.N. CERD regarding Australia's violation oflnternational obliga-
tions in regard to the Amended Native Title Act, 1998 (18 March 1999). See also 
paragraph 34 of the Alfonso Martinez Report, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/24, p. 9 in supra n. 
2. 
73. See Doyle, Circuit Judge 540 F. 2d. 1039 (lOth Cir. 1976). 
7 4. Appellants alleged that the ordinance contravenes the equal right protection 
and due process provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. Section 
1302(8). 
75. 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975) 
76. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
77. See Justice Doyle in the lOth Circuit, 540 F. 2d 1039 (1996): "In sum, if they 
were to approve the ordinance and in turn approve this plain discrimination, it would 
be tantamount to saying that the Indian Bill of Rights is merely an abstract state-
ment of principle. 
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equal protection to female members of Santa Clara Pueblo marrying 
non-members and their offsprings. The children of Julie and Myles 
Martinez are 100 percent Indian and 50 percent Santa Claran, speak-
ing the language of the Santa Clara Pueblo, namely Tewa. They prac-
tice the customs of the tribe and are accepted into the tribe's religion. 
Nevertheless, membership is denied and they stand to be excluded 
from the band with the right of inheritance, residency and voting, 
solely because their mother rather than their father is a Santa 
Claran.78 Had this occurred in Canada, or in the United States after 
the latter's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, the acceptance of the U.S. Government of international 
standards could provide a positive solution, notwithstanding the ef-
fect or absence thereof of the U.S. ratification of the Covenant. 79 The 
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. accept-
ance of international standards of non-discrimination based on gen-
der might supersede, if not override any suggestion of the supremacy 
or unquestionable validity of the ordinance of an otherwise autono-
mous indigenous community.80 
VII. THE RoLE OF THE JuDICIARY IN THE MEANINGFUL 
INTERPRETATION AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
The United Nations proclaimed 199381 the International Year of 
the World's Indigenous Peoples and the General Assembly had ear-
lier ushered in the International Decade of the World's Indigenous 
Peoples for 1990-2000.82 An interesting comparative analysis can be 
made of progressive legal developments in the United States and 
Australia in respect of the treatment of Native titles and the indige-
nous peoples' right to land. In this connection, the judiciary in each of 
the countries under review may be said to have played a decisive role, 
reflecting its willing determination or reluctance to give effect to na-
tional legislation and to provide a meaningful interpretation to its 
revealing provisions. 
78. Id. The Circuit Judge did not think that the Fourteenth Amendment stan-
dards of equal protection, however, apply with full force. They do nevertheless serve 
as persuasive guide to the decision. The Indian Bill of Rights is modeled after the 
Constitution of the United States and is to be interpreted in the light of Constitu-
tional Law decisions. 
79. See Shelton, "International Law," in U.S. Ratification of the International 
Covenant on Human Rights, 27, 29-33 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer ed., 1993). 
80. In any event, the U.S. Senate's advice and consent is subject to the Declara-
tion that the provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing. 
138 Cong. Rec. S 4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992). 
81. G.A. Res. 51178, U.N. Doc. A/Res/51178 (1997). See Amy Sender, Australia Ex-
ample of Treatment Towards Native Title: Indigenous People's Land Rights in Austra-
lia and the United States. 
82. G.A. Res. 45/164, U.N. Doc A/Res/45/164 (1991). 
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The theory of "terra nullius" was applied by the British and sub-
sequently by the United States Supreme Court in as early as 1823 in 
Johnson v. M'Intosh. 83 England proclaimed Australia as British terri-
tory in 178884 and successively expanded the doctrine of "terra nul-
lius" to later annexations such as the Murray Islands in 187985 at the 
expense of the original inhabitants under the pretext that the primi-
tive aboriginal population did not display any evidence of clearly 
identifiable laws and definitive titles to land.86 Thus, the adoption of 
Pacific Islander Acts, 187287 and 187588 made no provision for the 
continued existence of native titles. As late as 1971, in Milirrpum v. 
Nabalco Pty. Ltd.,89 the Yirrkala aborigines ofthe Gove Peninsula in 
the Northern territory of Australia were denied judicial recognition of 
their right to stop bauxite mining taking place on their land and no 
compensatory damages were awarded, Justice Blackburn holding 
that Australia did not recognize communal native title, the Yirrkala 
aborigines did not have continual connection to the land since 1788 
and that their relationship did not create a proprietary right. 90 
A significant change of judicial position took place in Mabo v. 
Queensland (1992) 91 after ten years of litigation, the High Court of 
Australia in a 6 to 1 decision overruled Justice Blackburn's decision 
in Milirrpum case, 92 in effect, recognizing native title. This decision 
is of general application and is not limited to the Meriam Aborigines 
in the Murray Islands, and that aboriginal and indigenous rights and 
titles survived annexation which did not operate to extinguish their 
claims. This case is a clear precedent for the biological descendents of 
the aboriginal inhabitants of the Murray Islands who maintained 
their customs and traditions. Other aboriginal groups might encoun-
ter other obstacles in the presentation of their respective claims. To 
put the treatment of aboriginal rights on a more clearly ascertainable 
basis, Australia passed the Native Title Act of 199393 to validate all 
83. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 534 (1823). 
84. See Bravo, "Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land and the Demands of Eco-
nomic Development, Lessons from the United States and Australia," 30 Colum. J. L. 
& Soc. Probs. 529, 531 (1997). 
85. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 1, 10. 
86. See Manwaring, "Recent Development," 34 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 177, 177 n. 1 
(1993). Indeed, such aboriginal inhabitants were not of a sufficient level of civilization 
to "own" the land effectively, or that the territory is practically unoccupied. See Mabo, 
107 A.L.R. at 4. 
87. 35 & 36 Viet. Ch. 19 (Eng.). 
88. 38 & 39 Viet. Ch. 51 (Eng.). 
89. (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141 (Austl.). 
90. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 77. 
91. (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1 (Austl.). Since Australia's acceptance of the Protocol, the 
U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has been in-
voked and may continue to be invoked by Australian indigenous tribes against the 
Australian Government for violation of international treaty obligation. 
92. See supra n. 89. 
93. See Native Title Act, §15(1)(b)(ii), §26-42, and §107-110. 
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prior acts where native titles were under sole ownership of non-na-
tives. Thus, claimants are not entitled to compensation if their title 
was extinguished after the Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination 
Act of 197 594 as long as proof was furnished of their connection with 
the land at annexation. A National Native Title Tribunal was created 
to serve as a mediating body to hear and process native title claims 
and fund programs to assist disputes over native titles. Although 
comprehensive, the National Native Title Act did not address the 
question of pastoral leases. The High Court in Wik People v. Queen-
sland (1996) 95 in a 4 to 3 decision ruled in favor of the aborigines Wik 
and Thayorre Peoples and held that the pastoral leases did not extin-
guish their native title. In 1994,96 the High Court of Australia was 
called upon by Western Australia to give a ruling on the constitution-
ality of the National Native Title Act 1993. Its constitutionality was 
upheld, finding a general power within the "races power" section of 
the Australian Constitution. 97 Despite the comprehensiveness of the 
Act and the willingness of the High Court of Australia to uphold in 
general the native titles and benefits in favor of aboriginal peoples, 
one section of the Act, section 12 was struck down "for attempting to 
convey legislative power upon the judicial branch ofthe government," 
by providing that "subject to this Act, the common law of Australia in 
respect of native title has after 30 June 1993, the force of a law of the 
Commonwealth."9 8 
If the Australian Judiciary appears to be willing to recognize the 
rights of the Aborigines almost to the extent of usurping the power of 
the legislature, it has recognized the Constitutional Supremacy of 
Parliament as an echo of the English doctrine of Parliamentary 
Supremacy, the United States Supreme Court cannot be said to be 
subject to such constitutional constraint. In reality, the United States 
Courts have been much freer and completely unrestrained in their 
role as interpreter of United States Constitution and federal legisla-
tion. As seen in the Marshall trilogy of judicial decisions,99 the U.S. 
Supreme Court was willing to recognize some indigenous states for 
Native Americans and their native title. On the legislative front, the 
battles have not been decisive. As early as 1790, Congress promul-
94. See Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 52 (Austl.), esp. § 9(1). See, however, 
Miller, "Comment, An Australian Nunavut: A Comparison of Inuit and Aboriginal 
Rights Movements in Canada and Australia," 12 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1175, 1195 
(1998). The Act could hardly be expected to bring racial discrimination to an auto-
matic end. 
95. (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (Austl.). 
96. Westem Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 128 A.L.R. 1,3 (Austl.). 
97. Id. at 43-45 and at 62-65. See also U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination Finding the Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 discriminates 
against Australian Indigenous land titleholders. 
98. See Native Title Act, 1993, ch. 110 S. 12. See Westem Australia case in 128 
A.L.R. 1, 3 (Austl.) at 43-44 and at 62-65. 
99. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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gated authority and prohibited unauthorized trade with Indians, 100 
followed by the period of the "reservation era" to force Indian out of 
their settled area onto confined reservations.l01 In 1871, Congress 
terminated treaty-making with Indians102 without abrogating ex-
isting treaties. The General Allotment Act (1887) broke up the land 
held communally by Native Americans into farming and ranching. 103 
Finally, Congress set a program distributing the excess land to non-
Indian settlers, thereby reducing the land held by indigenous Indians 
from 138 million acres in 1877 to 48 million acres in 1934.104 
The Supreme Court in the Lone Wolf case (1924)105 denied in-
junctive relief requested by the Kiowa and Commanche tribes for vio-
lation of Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek106 in 1946, 
the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) was established to process and 
evaluate the Native American claims against the U.S. Government. 
The ICC was terminated in 1978, leaving the remaining cases un-
heard and as the claims became non-compensable under the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Claims.107 In 1955, the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians of 
Alaska unsuccessfully brought suit against the government to re-
cover compensation for the timber taken from their land.l08 The Su-
preme Court reaffirmed that Native Americans' rights to native title 
were not constitutionally protected property rights and could be ex-
tinguished.109 The Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux Nation of 
Indians (1980) 110 extended further the government control over Indi-
ans. The shift was from "good faith" to " good faith effort", and the 
test was exclusively on the legitimacy of the government in its exer-
100. See the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 33 Stat. 137 (1790) repealed in 
1793. 
101. See the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834), See Act 
of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (codified and amended 25 U.S. C. § 71 (1994): 
hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United States 
may contract by treaty. Id. at 566. 
102. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871), See Cross, "Sovereign 
Bargains, Indian Takings and the Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-first 
Century," 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 425, 431 (1998). 
103. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). 
104. In June 1996, a class action suit was brought by over 300,000 Native Ameri-
cans alleging mishandling of allotment of land by the federal government from the 
1887 General Allotment Act. Cobell v. Babbit, 30 F. Supp. 2d. 24 (D.D.C. 1998), and 
North Cir. 96-1285, 1999 WL. 607188 at 21 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1999). 
105. Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock 187 U.S. 553, at 568 (1903). 
106. Article 12 of the Treaty requires the consent of three-fourth of the adult males 
of the Kiowa and Commanche tribes before their land could be taken, Oct. 21, 1867, 
Articles 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585. 
107. 25 U.S.C. § 70v (1978). Only Indian tribes and not individuals were entitled to 
bring claims before the ICC. 
108. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). 
109. Id. at 287-88 and 290. 
110. 448 u.s. 371 (1980). 
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cise of plenary power over the Indian land, regardless of the economic 
losses and hardships suffered by Native Americans.U 1 
The future of Native American titles to land appears bleak, in 
the light of the composition of the current Supreme Court, which ap-
pears to be lacking in enthusiasm if indeed not total absence of inter-
est in cases involving native Americans. Native Americans currently 
exist, like Australian Aborigines, with distinct and independent cul-
tures, with their own customs, traditions, languages, religions and 
government. But unlike Australia, the United States does not exhibit 
the same keen sense of political awareness of the need to protect the 
property rights of indigenous Americans. Lacking the political will 
within the judicial branch of the government, which is supreme in the 
United States, very little or nothing by way of positive progressive 
developments could be expected in the foreseeable future, barring 
any fundamental change of circumstances bordering a miracle. 112 
It is difficult at this juncture to assess the future status of Native 
Americans in regard to native title given the lack of the political will 
on the part of the judiciary to champion the cause of freedom for all 
without distinction as to races, religions, culture, etc. Comparing re-
cent statistics, Australian Aborigines today have potential claims to 
seventy-nine percent of Australia's land,113 ten years ago their own-
ership claims were only fourteen percent. 114 One author comments 
that the Indians' reliance on the "white man's court" to adjudicate 
their rights "blunted the capacity" of America's Indigenous peoples 
for more autonomous form of political action and prevented aborigi-
nal issues from becoming as prominent on U.S. political agenda as 
they now are in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.l 15 Nor have 
legal developments in the United States in the field of cultural and 
religious self-determination been particularly encouraging, having 
regard to the historical picture of the Christianization efforts and the 
suppression of indigenous religious ceremonies.116 Twentieth-century 
efforts to vindicate religious rights have not been noteworthy in spite 
of express provisions in the United States Constitution protecting the 
111. Id. at 407-17. Under Federal Indian Policy, "plenary power" means a) exclu-
sive, b) preemptive, and c) unlimited power of congress over the Indians, including 
their lands and resources. 
112. See Getches, "Conquering the Cultural Frontiers: The New Subjectivism of 
the Supreme Court in Indian Law," 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573, 1631 (1996); Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Stevens appear more disposed to show a serious interest in 
this area. The willingness of the Supreme Court to provide protection of indigenous 
interests will be crucial. 
113. See Rodriguez, "Note," 23 N.C.J. Int'l. L. & Com. Reg. 711, 727 (1998). 
114. Id. at 711. 
115. See Russel, "High Courts and the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples: The Limits of 
Judicial Independence," 61 Sask. L. Rev. 247, 267 (1998), at 254. 
116. See Dussias, "The Rights to Cultural and Religious Self-Determination: Les-
sons from the Experience of Native Americans," 2 ILSA J. Int'l & Camp. L. 633-41 
(1996). 
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right to free exercise of religion and the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA).l17 There is a remote possibility that 
Native American free exercise claimants may find some relief in fu-
ture cases under the terms of the Religious Freedom Restructure Act 
(RFRA) of 1993118 as a partial response to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Or-
egon v. Smith.ll9 The 1994 Amendments to AIRFA to ensure 
lawfulness, under the State and federal law of the ceremonial use of 
peyote by tribal members120 may afford limited protection to the 
practice of a certain tribal religious ceremony. 
One area where progress may be expected in the not too distant 
future is the process of consultation within the inter-governmental 
relations committee of the United States on such important matters 
as the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples.121 
This practice should be encouraged and the Native Indians of all 
tribes should be encouraged to participate in the consultation pro-
cess. It is nonetheless too early to assess the effectiveness of the con-
sultative process.122 
VIII. THE STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AND 
OUTsiDE THEIR HoMELANDS 
In the preceding section an examination has been made of the 
status of indigenous peoples who have been subjected to Western in-
vasion and colonization and as a consequence suffered the fate of be-
ing the victims of invaders' legal regime in their own birthplace. For 
the Native American Indians in the North and South American Con-
tinents, in the United States, Canada, Mexico, 123 Peru, 124 Brazil, 125 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994); See in particular Lyng v. Northwest Indian Country 
Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1998) at 453. 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb-1 to 2000 bb-4 (1994). 
119. 494 U.S. 872, at 889-890. 
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 a (b)(l) (1994). 
121. See, for instance, The Report of the Inter-governmental Relations Committee 
on Navajo Native Delegation to the Working Group of the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights Sixth Session, Geneva, Switzerland, Sept. 6, 2000. 
122. A study published in the Annual Survey of Int'l and Comparative Law of 
Golden Gate University recommends that the U.N. allows Iroquois, Cherokee, Nav-
ajo, Seminole, and other tribes membership into the United Nations. Some 166,000 
Navajos, 43,000 Cherokees and other Indians own more than 96 million acres ofland 
in the United States. 
123. See Roberts, "The Protection oflndigenous Populations' Cultural Property in 
Peru, Mexico, and the United States," 4 Tulsa J. Int'l L., 327 (1997). The United 
States, Mexico and Peru have become parties to the UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Protecting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Ownership of Cul-
tural Property, 1970. 1860 U.N.T.S. 234-236: Cultural property is defmed as "prop-
erty which, on religious or secular grounds, is specially designated by each State as 
being of importance for archeology, pre-history, history, literature, art or science". 
124. Id. See also John E. Conkline, Art Crime 187-88, at 280 (1994). 
125. See Suagee, "Human Rights oflndigenous People: Will the United States Rise 
to the Occasion?," 21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 365 (1997). 
2002] RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS 25 
and Ecuador,126 or indeed for the restoration of indigenous rights of 
the aboriginal populations of Australia and the Maoris in New Zea-
land, 127 their sufferings have been practically prototype, their status 
non-existent, their right of access to courts negligible128 and legal 
remedies inconsiderable.129 The problems to be addressed in this sec-
tion concern other regions of the world, where the indigenous or ab-
original populations have continued to coexist and to maintain their 
distinctive traditional, religious, linguistic and cultural existence 
within an autonomous, independent sovereign national entity, and 
universally recognized as such for all times. These indigenous peo-
ples include the Thais, the Chinese and to and appreciable extent the 
Japanese. Within a long span of time frame, the Thais and the Chi-
nese who are indigenous to East and Southeast Asia, have managed 
to maintain their distinctive cultures and traditions as well as their 
continuous political independence, The Japanese have had a much 
later start and had to contend with pre-existing aborigines and indig-
enous islanders before their settlement in the main islands of Japan. 
It is of interest to compare the experience of the Thais with that of 
the Chinese in their original homelands and the treatment each peo-
ple received as overseas residents. The Sino-Thai comparison pro-
vides an interesting contrast. 
A. Indigenous and Overseas Chinese 
The Chinese indigenous populations took millennia and centu-
ries to consolidate the unification of their homeland which is China 
today through various dynasties and revolutions, including the latest 
cultural revolution. The different groups of war lords divided and 
ruled various regions and provinces of China for many long years. All 
through its national history, China has absorbed within the Celestial 
Empire countless ethnic Asian and Southeast Asian minorities, 
among them the Tibetans, the Thais in Yunnan Province (at one time 
Thai Autonomous State), the Manchus and various Chinese ethnic 
groups, Cantonese, Taechiew, Hainannese, Hakka, Fukinese, 
Hunannese, Szechwan, etc. It may be said that today the Chinese 
indigenous peoples themselves are in power determining their own 
destinies and not subject to any alien domination or occupation, ex-
cept for one whole century, China persevered under the regime of 
126. See Lopez Bermudez, "Indigenous Peoples and International Law: The Case 
of Ecuador," St. Thomas L. Rev. Fall (1997). 
127. See McHugh, "The Constitutional Role of the Waitangi Tribunal," 3 N.Z.L. 
Journal 224 (1985). See also Quentin-Baxter, "The U.N. Draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples - The International and Constitutional Law Contexts," 
29 Victoria U. of Wellington L. R. 85 (1999). 
128. See e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
129. Or indeed unheeded as in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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western extraterritoriality or what the Chinese labeled "unequal 
treaties". 
Within China itself, the Chinese are indigenous and can assert 
their rights under their own constitution arid existing legal regime, 
affording some measure of protection of the rights of the individuals 
as a general aspect of human rights rather than the rights of indige-
nous peoples. However, overseas Chinese, in a way not dissimilar 
from Indians from Asia, have become minorities in various regions 
and countries of the world. As members of minorities groups, the 
rights of overseas Chinese have not always been consistently recog-
nized. For instance, in Thailand, peoples of Chinese descent have 
long been accepted as assimilated Thais with all the rights and obli-
gations of Thai subjects. They are nevertheless allowed large free-
doms to practice their own religions: Confucianism, Buddhism, 
Taoism, Animism, etc., and to speak and write their own Chinese dia-
lects, subject to one proviso only. No additional Chinese schools or 
schools in which the medium of teaching is Chinese would be allowed, 
the Thai Government policy of containing the Chinese or defending 
indigenous Thai cultures has tolerated no further expansion of Chi-
nese linguistic imperialism. The results have been salutary. The sec-
ond and third generation Chinese are more conversant with Thai 
literature than they are at home with Chinese, thus preventing or 
pre-empting reverse assimilation in cultural transformation. The as-
similation policy of the Thai Government has left the cultural tradi-
tions of the Chinese virtually intact, while, legally speaking the Thais 
of Chinese ancestry suffer no social inferiority, nor political 
disabilities. 
The treatment of Overseas Chinese in other countries in Asia 
have not been as benevolent to the Chinese. In Jap:;tn, the Chinese 
communities minorities sticking together in Yokohama and a handful 
of other townships, while the use of Kanji in Japanese language has 
not served as a link to accelerate the assimilation process, one way or 
another. In other parts of Asia, Chinese minorities are not accorded 
the most favorable treatment. Outside Asia, in Europe and the 
United States, "affirmative actions" mean for Chinese, as they do for 
most Asians, that to survive the Chinese as much as other Asian 
counterparts have to perform twice or three times better to be ac-
cepted as equals. Overseas Chinese and Asian Indians in South Af-
rica, for instance, during the Apartheid regime were separated from 
Whites and native Africans. Even the legislature had three compo-
nent parts, according to the colour of their complexion. 
B. Thais in Thailand and Other Native Lands 
The Tais or Thais and Chinese are indigenous to East Asian and 
Southeast Asian regions that for millennia have overlapped. Inevita-
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bly, both have endured the co-existence that has been intermittently 
peaceful. The Thais were at one time moving southwards from the 
Yangtse Valley into the Golden Penninsula, split into countless Thai 
Kingdoms; Nan Chao, Lanna, Lanchang, Shan State, Twelve Panna, 
Twelve Chu Thai, Saen Wee, Payao, Chieng Mai, Sukhothai, 
Lopburi, Ayudhaya, Laos, Dien Bien Phu, Assam etc. The main 
stream little Thais settled in what is known as Thailand today, while 
other ethnic Thais, including Black Thais and Big Thais, remain in 
Northern Myanmar, East India and Northern Vietnam. Nanchao 
kingdom surrendered to one of the three Chinese Kingdoms. Beng 
Hek annexed Yunnan more than a thousand years ago.130 
The original Thais in today's Thailand have maintained political 
independence, sacrificing its outlying tributary provinces to Western 
colonial powers. As indigenous, the Thais have had to hold their own, 
and their ground. If Thailand were as large as China and as popu-
lous, it would have been less difficult. But with fewer populations and 
more limited territorial domain, Thailand has succeeded in warding 
off several waves of Western expansion.l31 Thus, the problem for the 
Thais as aborigines and indigenous to the homeland has been how to 
defend it and how to survive against all odds with distinctive cul-
tures, language and civilization dating back to over 5,000 years of 
continuous existence. 
The problems encountered by indigenous Thais outside Thailand 
are worth noting. In Yunnan, the Thais received no special treatment 
as minorities. They were long required to learn Chinese and be as-
similated. Yet, through centuries, they managed to maintain their 
distinct identities as Thais, preserving Thai language, cultures and 
traditions. During the height of the cold war, Yunnan or formerly 
Nanchao was upgraded as a Thai Autonomous State, in preparation, 
as it were, for reunification with the Kingdom of Thailand under Chi-
nese hegemony. Today, the cold war is history and The People's Re-
public of China is collaborating with its neighbor to the south in more 
than one way, not least of which is to make Kunming, the capital of 
Yunnan, a place of touristic attraction for Thai visitors, thereby re-
ducing the tension and pre-empting potential conflicts between the 
two countries. 
Indigenous Thais in other Southeast Asian countries are minori-
ties, except perhaps in Laos where they are integrated majorities, as 
the Thais and the Laotains are really indistinguishable as Thai-Lao 
or Siam-Lao ethnic groups. In Shan State, they are minorities of My-
anmar and await separation or settlement as their internal political 
status improves. The Thai-Ahoms in Assam and the Black Thais in 
130. See W.A.R. Wood, A History of Siam (1924); and Rong Sayamananda, A His-
tory of Thailand, Chulalongkorn (1976). 
131. Id. 
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Vietnam are integral part of ethnic Thai minorities. Their rights as 
minorities groups depend on the particular legal systems under 
which they find themselves. 
Within the territory of Thailand today, apart from Chinese mi-
norities, assimilated Chinese Thais and Thai Muslims in the four 
Southern provinces, in the North and in the central plain, there live 
several indigenous tribal communities and nomadic hill tribes, such 
as the Mon-Khmer, the Maew, the Mong, the Karens, the Kachin, the 
Lasu and rarely the Southern Negritos. Central Government policies 
towards non-Thai indigenous ethnic minorities have varied from time 
to time. Currently, freedom of opinion and thought, including free-
dom of religion and worship seems to be prevailing with the result 
that secessionist and separatist movements in the South and the 
Northeast appear to have provisionally subsided. If all the indigenous 
populations of Thailand who are non-Thai and non-Buddhist can feel 
socially integrated in a pluralistic society, relative peace and stability 
will continue to reign. Problems of social and cultural importance ex-
ist, however, with regard to a number of "montagnards" or "hill 
tribes", who move from hillside to another, cutting timber and culti-
vating opium. Royal projects have been launched with some measure 
of success to integrate these various ethnic hill tribes. 
Other frontier problems relate to the influx of political and eco-
nomic "refugees" from neighboring countries, Myanmar, Laos, 
Kampuchea, and Vietnam. These uninvited neighbors are treated as 
displaced persons or illegal immigrants, and only in exceptional cases 
where they are sponsored by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees that they are given additional protection. 
Thailand could not afford to accord all displaced persons the status of 
"refugees". They are nonetheless indigenous populations of countries 
adjacent to the Kingdom and include identifiable ethnic groups with 
existing counterparts in Thailand. Economic and social difficulties 
notwithstanding, Thailand has agreed to abide by the principle of 
"non-refoulement", meaning non-repatriation at the frontier. The dis-
placed persons can be admitted into the Kingdom as the country of 
first refuge, whence they could strive to seek more permanent resi-
dence or asylum elsewhere. Such is the plight of various "refugees" 
who cannot return to their homelands until peace, calm and harmony 
can be restored. 
IX. THE STATUS OF DECOLONIZED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
THEIR NATIVE LANDS 
A survey of this nature cannot be complete without reference to 
the status of countless groups of indigenous populations whose fa-
therland has been decolonized, but other tribal chiefs have taken the 
control of the lands once unified under colonial domination. Not un-
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like the richly populated subcontinent ofBarata (India), the ethnicity 
of Nigeria is so vastly divergent that there is no precise definition of 
Nigeria apart from the geographical location or limits within which 
Nigeria is situated.132 
The word "tribe" is hardly appropriate to describe these Nigerian 
ethnic groups. The Ibo or Igbo and Hausa-Fulani are five to ten mil-
lion strong for each group. The majority groups consist of the Y oruba 
and the above two groups. The Hausa-Fulani are made up oftwo sub-
groups, the Rausa and the Fulani. In November 1990, an Ogoni Bill 
of Rights was presented to the Government and People of Nigeria, 
claiming as the people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo 
Khana and Tai) numbering about half a million people, being a sepa-
rate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, that in pre-British colonial days they were not conquered or 
colonized by any other ethnic groups in present day Nigeria. Their 
complaints related specially to the mining of the Ogoni land in vari-
ous oil fields providing resources of over 30 billion U.S. dollars from 
which the Ogoni, who owned the land to which they were indigenous 
received nothing in return. The Ogoni people have no representation, 
no pipe-borne water, no electricity, no job opportunity and no social or 
economic development project of the Federal Government.133 
Like most indigenous peoples who have been colonized and ulti-
mately liberated, the Ogoni people seek political autonomy, a notion 
of self-determination, to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a 
distinct and separate unit. In particular, the Ogoni seek direct repre-
sentation in all Nigerian national institutions, the use and develop-
ment of Ogoni language in Ogoni territory and the rights to religious 
freedom as well as the right to protect the Ogoni environment and 
ecology from further degradation. In other words, the Ogoni are seek-
ing equal protection and equal treatment as any other ethnic group, 
equally indigenous to the land within the Republic. The basic issues 
of the Ogoni case may be summarized to include: (1) their participa-
tion in the making of decisions that affect them; (2) the need for im-
proved attention to the development of minority tribes that account 
for the wealth ofthe nation; (3) the need to balance economic benefits; 
(4) the need for the government to exercise restraint in clamping 
down on Ogoni protests in their demand for increased attention or 
some basic principles of self-determination; and (5) the recognition 
and respect for human rights by the Federal Government when deal-
ing with them. 
132. See Simon A. Rakov, Vassar College '92 (English 32, Fall1990). Ethnicity in 
Nigeria African Postcolonial, in English, in the Postcolonial Web. 
133. See The Ogoni Bill of Rights, November 1990, available at http://dawodu.net/ 
ogonibillofrights. 
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Not unlike other indigenous ethnic groups in newly independent 
countries, the national government is called upon to provide equal 
care and protection to all peoples, minorities or indigenous, or aborig-
ines or otherwise labeled. The possibility of equitable distribution of 
wealth depends on the political will of the entire population as well as 
the farsightedness of the government in power. 
X. CoNCLUSIONS 
The preceding survey of selected practice in a handful of legal 
systems can scarcely afford a solid basis for any conclusive report. 
Suffice it merely to expose comparativists to a far wider spectrum of 
problems encountered by indigenous populations the world over, 134 
and not confined to the profusion of literature based on Eurocentric 
experience to redeem the effect of ethnocidal and genocidal measures. 
No amount of legal or constitutional provisions or safeguards could 
ensure the actual enjoyment of indigenous rights. Several Western-
style bureaucratic and administrative obstacles have stood in the 
way of fruitful implementation of the principles ofbasic freedoms and 
fundamental human rights for the indigenous peoples as a collectiv-
ity of populations with their distinctive cultural, linguistic, religious 
and other heritage. It should not be forgotten that indigenous rights 
are collective as well as individual human rights, and that all human 
rights entail obligations on the part of the States, at least within 
their territorial jurisdiction and/or control. 
Access to court is a minimum standard, but to what avail if there 
is no favourable applicable law in place nor willing judges freely to 
give effect to updated beneficial legal provisions. The decision in 
Worcester v. Georgia is reminiscent of the need for the willingness on 
the part of all the agencies, notably the executive branch of the gov-
ernment to enforce the law and judicial decision properly rendered 
after careful judicial deliberation and formulation. 
A sound policy at the national level in favour of the indigenous 
peoples is indispensable to their survival as distinct and separate but 
equal ethnic groups. More significant than government policy is the 
growing consciousness on the part of the bulk of the population repre-
sented on the central government, who may feel the urge to share a 
more liberal outlook. It is the psychology of the mass that deserves a 
higher level of education to be free from pre-existing bias and 
prejudices based on ignorance and human greed, and to tolerate and 
appreciate the existence of the world outside the one in which we live. 
After all, globalization does not mean the imposition of our world on 
the outside world. Rather a search should be made better to under-
134. See the trail-blazer in a White Paper by Russel Barsh, in supra n. 11; and the 
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, presented by Miguel Alfonso 
Martinez, President-Rapporteur at the close of the decade, supra n. 2. 
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stand the world around us. While the caste system was long abol-
ished under the Indian Constitution, the existence of class distinction 
still lingers on. One of the lessons that can be learned from this cur-
sory exercise is the apparent potentiality of international efforts 
which can be orchestrated to substantiate and nourish the common 
hope for the survival with honour of every living thing on earth, every 
species of breathing being, a human being, be it or not part and par-
cel of an indigenous people or aborigines or immigrants or otherwise. 
If persons are equal individually, they should also receive the same 
respect and the same treatment collectively as distinct ethnic groups. 
All things considered and with a balanced approach, every one, every 
nation, every State should rally in unison to come to rescue and assist 
all indigenous groups currently in distress in various parts of the 
globe. Let them have self-determination and the comfort of the free-
doms that can be happily shared by all. 
Wishful thinking and popular aspirations apart, endeavours 
should be made to secure the adoption and implementation of the 
draft U.N. International Bill of Rights for the Indigenous Peoples, 
who have every where and at all times endured countless and endless 
sufferings. If everything, good or evil, must come to an end, there 
should be ways and means of ending these sufferings. With this com-
mon resolve, at all levels, international, regional, national, provin-
cial, municipal and village, it becomes transparent that legal 
development and evolution, in this as well as in all other areas, pro-
ceeds within a given time-frame. Thus, the law relating to the status 
of the indigenous peoples, both international and comparative, can 
and must be viewed in its proper temporal dimension. What was con-
sidered not wrongful yesterday may be prohibited today, such as ge-
nocide and ethnocide. What is not yet recognized today may receive 
general recognition tomorrow, such as the U.N. Draft Declaration on 
the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples. There is still hope for all, as the 
applicable law, international and national or comparative, cannot be 
otherwise than inter-temporal. 
